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Tears and transformation: feeling like
crying as an indicator of insightful or
“aesthetic” experience with art
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1Department of Basic Research and Research Methods, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria,
2Graduate School of Information Science, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan
This paper explores a fundamental similarity between cognitive models for crying and
conceptions of insight, enlightenment or, in the context of art, “aesthetic experience.”
All of which center on a process of initial discrepancy, followed by schema change, and
conclude in a proposed adjustment or “transformation” of one’s self image/world-view.
Because tears are argued to mark one of the only physical indicators of this cognitive
outcome, and because the process is particularly salient in examples with art, I argue that
crying may provide an intriguing marker for empirical study of art experience. To explore
this parallel, I offer a review of crying theory as well as of tearful cases with art, pointing
out the key cognitive elements. I then introduce an expanded crying model, based
upon our recent model of art experience which does consider insight and adjustment
or application of the self. I also consider multiple emotional and evaluative factors, which
may co-vary with crying response. This theoretical discussion is then applied in three
exploratory, survey-based studies conducted within U.K., Japan and U.S. museums, and
including what is claimed to be the 20th century’s most tear-inducing abstract paintings.
Results showed—with cross-cultural consistency—significant relation between “feeling
like crying” and a collection of responses posited to indicate a full progression to
aesthetic experience, as well as to positive assessment of artwork goodness, beauty,
understanding of meaning, and to final reported self reflection and epiphany. I argue
that, beyond the question of why we may cry, by considering the implications of what
tears may indicate within information processing, feeling like crying may indeed offer a
compelling basis for empirically identifying outcomes of perceptual (art) experience.
Keywords: crying, tears, art, insight, schema change, aesthetic experience, cognitive model, museum study
Introduction
The phenomenon of tears in perceptual experience has long been intriguing. In anthropology,
Freedberg (1989) argues that tears, though rare, are among the most universal responses
to visual images. Lutz (1999) gives a similar claim for tears in sociology. Add the (often
anecdotal) evidence for what types of stimuli evoke crying, and this topic becomes even
more compelling for psychology. While a great deal of crying research (Vingerhoets et al.,
1997 for review) has focused on interpersonal relations, it is often accounts of inanimate
and “simple” things—a sunset, a sculpture, or painting—that stand out in popular discussion
(e.g., Frey and Langseth, 1985; Lutz, 1999). Individuals cry before stimuli that do not change.
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They cry before stimuli that are not sad, or those which are
beautiful, empty or over-/under-whelming. This may be nowhere
more pronounced than within the domain of art, which serves as
a nexus for such encounters (see Elkins, 2001 for review). Yet,
despite much work of a belletristic nature, there has been little
effort to address art- or image-related crying from a psychological
or empirical perspective (Wolterstorff, 2003). “Why do we cry”
in these cases of perception, Lutz (p. 19) concluded in a recent
review, “what, exactly, do tears express?”
It may be this latter question, however, that holds the
greatest potential, particularly for psychological study of art.
This paper explores a novel approach to crying, based on a
cross-topic theoretical review of current theory regarding crying
response. This poses a two-factor model, which suggests that
tears arise from a cognitive/physiological mechanism involving
initial discrepancy in interaction and a second change in
schema/expectations that allows for resolution and which can
theoretically be connected to an adjustment or “transformation”
in the structure of the self. This model has made an important
contribution in uniting myriad discussions of crying, integrating
behavioral, cognitive and physiological elements. Most intriguing
for the present study, when the model is explored for its
theoretical basis, the outcome and cognitive progression posited
for crying appear to share a fundamental overlap with recent
discussion of insight and “aesthetic” experience with art. Thus,
beyond the question of why we may cry, by considering
implications of what tears may indicate for information
processing, feeling like crying may be a useful tool in analysis of
perception or viewing art.
I will consider the above parallels with the goal of providing
a platform for future theoretical and empirical research. I review
the crying theory and its emphasis on cognitive schema change,
connecting this to examples of crying with art. Based on our
previous model of art viewing, I then propose an updated model
of the key crying progression which does explicitly consider
the implications of schema change. I also consider a number
of other hypothesized emotional, evaluative, self-referential, and
understanding factors posited to connect to the model stages and
which may show empirical correlation with a crying response.
I also consider efficacy of using self-report “feeling like crying,”
as opposed to direct physiological measure, as an unobtrusive
means of recording tearful insight. I conclude by applying
this model to three exploratory studies of feeling like crying,
conducted with museum art.
Review: The Two-factor Theory of Crying
and Self/Schema Change
The last quarter century has seen an emerging consensus
regarding the source of adult (i.e., non-infantile or chemically-
induced Nelson, 1998) crying. This marks an important change
from earlier approaches. Labeled by Labott and Martin (1988)
as “the hydraulic overflow theory,” previous theories, both in
psychology (Borgquist, 1906; Bindra, 1972) and philosophy
(Koestler, 1964; Darwin, 1965), had looked for specific emotional
or contextual elements and then attempted to sort responses
into varieties of “crying situations.” The cognitive approach
on the other hand, introduced by Efran and Spangler (1979;
refined by Frey and Langseth, 1985; Labott and Martin, 1988;
Vingerhoets et al., 1997; Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2003),
argues that the pertinent element is not whether one felt
happy or sad, but rather a specific outcome of information
processing centering on two key events: (1) an initial arousal of
cognitive dissonance due to discrepancy between expectations
and perception, leading to a period of tension or anxiety in which
individuals search for resolution or try to repress discrepancy’s
consequence; followed by (2) either a psychological or external
“triggering” change that causes re-assessment and elicitation of
tears.
To take one example, the movie Brian’s Song (ABC TV
Movie of the week; Witt and Kulik, 1971), which has served
as a reliably tear-evoking stimulus (Frey and Langseth, 1985):
a viewer, presented with a story of a young well-liked football
player, forms an initial hopeful expectation (1A). The character is
then stricken with chronic illness (1B), with which both character
and viewer spend the majority of the movie attempting to cope;
until a final development—the death of the character (2)—causes
one to give up expectations, accept reality and, only after these
two events, to potentially begin crying.
While on the surface this seems a rather simplistic
explanation—one would naturally expect crying at a character’s
death—it is this progression that is argued to unite all
crying cases. More importantly, when looking at the cognitive
underpinnings of this process, prevalent discussion grounds
the crying outcome in a specific mechanism whereby viewers
confront discrepancies within the act of information processing
in terms of relation to their self. Discrepancies can arise
for any number of reasons—failure, loss (Frey and Langseth,
1985), interpersonal tensions (Frey et al., 1983), confusion,
difficulty (Efran and Spangler, 1979), even empathically through
fictitious events (Labott and Martin, 1988). In each case,
discrepancy involves two relative cognitions, representing a
viewer’s hypothetical image of the world or perceptual and/or
conceptual schema and the perceived “reality” of a given
moment. This is experienced as a threat to the self, challenging
existing schema (Hill and Martin, 1997) and leading to
sympathetic nervous system (fight/flight) response (Patel, 1993;
Gross et al., 1994). Discrepancy may also be sad. However, in
numerous studies (Labott and Martin, 1988 for review) in which
a viewer is presented with a first arousing or discrepant portion
of this sequence, while withholding final (either sad or happy)
resolution, there is an inverse correlation with crying. Rather,
the key point comes to be the second event, regarding how an
individual responds.
Because this involves schema- or self-questioning, individuals
typically structure interactions to avoid such discrepant events,
employing pre-expectational filters, or, if discrepancy arises,
attempting to diminish or escape from involvement (e.g.,
Pelowski and Akiba, 2011). Crying, on the other hand, is
argued to occur specifically in those rare cases when viewers
do not assimilate or escape. Forced into an intractable position,
they instead adopt a self-referential approach to interaction,
acknowledging discrepancy, “giving up” attempts at overt
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control, eventually confronting and changing their own schema
or expectations, and thereby through such schema change,
causing the previous “psychological barrier or perturbation to
disappear” (Efran and Spangler, 1979, p. 63).
This then becomes the crux of crying. Crying arousal is argued
to be a physiological response of the parasympathetic nervous
system accompanying relief of tension following schema change
(Frey and Langseth, 1985; Patel, 1993; Gross et al., 1994). And
tears, placed within this cognitive frame, become a specific “sign”
for this “cognitive or psychological reorganization” (Efran and
Spangler, p. 68; see also Hill and Martin, 1997); indicating,
instead of preservation of existing schema through assimilation
or escape, the overcoming of self-protection (Bohart, 1980);
coinciding, through underlying tie of schema to the self, with
relative change in the self image (Hill and Martin); ultimately
signaling what Barbalet (2005) called a “self transformation.”
Individuals may report any number of emotions at points
during which barriers are presented and embellished, Efran
and Spangler (p. 70) conclude, but potentially in all cases
(Labott and Martin, 1988; Hendriks and Vingerhoets, 2002 for
reviews) when individuals do cry, they report tearfulness “only”
at this point where they experience disappearance of a barrier,
solution to a problem, or transformation of a previously held
worldview1.
The Two-factor Theory and Examples with Art
It is here that compelling connection can be made to
psychological study of perception and to the unique case of art.
First, this two-factor progression and final outcome is readily
applicable to especially art interactions.While existing discussion
has focused primarily on social and temporal events—where one
stumbles across a discrepant life element, attempts to repress or
cope with its implication, and eventually gives up or gives in to
a changing environment—art-history gives a wealth of examples,
in multiple media, of discrepancy, reflection, schema revision, as
well as explicit mention of transformations of the self. Several
are collected in Table 1, dividing discussion into the two key
cognitive elements.
For example, this progression can arise from abstract painting,
where according to Elkins (2001), the sheer austerity or opacity
of a work may render a viewer unable to understand or process
its meaning, leading to a “turning point” where one can either
desist or undergo reflection and revision in one’s expectations
for perceiving the art—ending in the latter case with crying.
Similar discussion can be found with Postmodern sculpture,
where for example an account by Fraser (2006), involved a work
by the American artist Fred Sandback composed only of string
strung floor to ceiling, demarcating ephemeral spaces (Figure 1).
In her encounter she recalled feeling that the works were so
devoid of substance that they led her to question the ontological
viability of art, causing a subsequent questioning of art making,
and—because she was herself an artist—causing a re-evaluation
of herself. The same progression can be found in reactions to
the mimetic content of numerous Romantic, Renaissance, and
1Put by Sartre, more poetically, and touching on the forthcoming argument in art:
in crying the individual “changes [their] relation to the world in order that the
world may change its qualities” (in Lutz, p. 240).
Baroque paintings (Figure 1), which somehow pose a theme
or scene that challenges the viewer. This can also be traced in
discussions of music, literature, opera, as well as even in happy
or moving cases (see “beauty, perfection, overwhelming stimuli,”
and “happy endings” in Table 1). In every instance there is some
manner of expectation, some discrepancy and some adjustment
of perception, ideas, and self.
Crying and Art: Indicator of Insightful or
“Aesthetic” Experience?
More important than these examples in and of themselves, is the
suggestion of what they may indicate when considered within
the frame of information-processing/art experience. As recently
explored by Pelowski and Akiba (2011) in a review and model for
art perception, it is this same outcome of self/schema change and
this same cognitive chain of events—specifically as they do occur
in such static contexts—that form the essential basis of numerous
conceptions of insight and adjustment within perception
itself.
Notably, Gadamer (1984; also Rothbaum et al., 1982) argued
that this movement between discrepancy and self/schema change
represents the distinction between “facile” interpretation and
deepened perception or personal growth. Torrance (1979)
focused on these same events in review of epiphanic or
“aha” encounters in education. The same progression was
highlighted in a recent cognitive/neurological review of insight
by Sandkühler and Bhattacharya (2008). And within discussion of
art, it is this overcoming of discrepancy and self/schema change
that represents the distinction between superficial or abortive
interaction and an “aesthetic”—i.e., novel, profound—experience
(Dufrenne, 1973; Dewey, 1980; Adorno, 1984). Lasher et al.
(1983; p. 197; see also Funch, 1997 for review), give an almost
verbatim reprisal of the art examples above. They argue, there
is “a representational conflict” between schema and perception,
leading to some discrepant response. “There is next the discovery
of a mental resolution which is immediately recognized as
being correct in that it dissolves the preceding (difficulty),”
ending in novelty or insight. Noting this similarity, Miceli and
Castelfranchi (2003, p. 261; see also Barbalet, 2005) have gone
so far as to explicitly suggest that the “special frustration” and
final resolution of these concepts may directly correspond to, and
perhaps be indicated by, crying—especially with art.
This then raises an intriguing potential for empirical study,
which the remainder of this paper will explore. While each
account of crying is unique, by taking this emergent cognitive
theory and considering via parallel discussion of insight and
aesthetic response, tears may provide a means of empirically
dividing and evaluating art or other perceptual experience. In
fact, Frey and Langseth (1985; Labott and Martin, 1988) have
argued that tears, or as I consider here even “feeling like crying,”
may represent one of the only physical responses specifically
linked to self/schema change, and therefore one of the few explicit
indicators of this progression. Crying may also be of specific
importance to more ecologically valid museum-based study,
because it is in such contexts where it is difficult to unobtrusively
assess psychological response (e.g., Jacobsen, 2006). The stages
posited for crying have also been argued to be key components of
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TABLE 1 | Cases of tears from art, considered via the two-factor theory of cryinga
Expectation + discrepancy Self/schema transformation
Abstract/modern
painting
Elkins (2001), in a historical review, contends that tears occur when a viewer
has a vested interest in perceiving/understanding an artwork yet they find
that they cannot understand. He argued interaction “converge(s) on two
kinds of experience.” Works seem “unbearably full, complex, daunting, or
somehow too close to be properly seen” or “empty, dark, painfully vast,
cold, and somehow too far away to be understood” (p. pxi). This leads to
uncomfortable “turning point” (p. 11), “the moment when they have seen
everything they can, and they sense its time to look away.”
Viewers may either walk away (the abortive outcome in this
paper’s model) or confront expectations, give up attempt at
processing and eventually accept or retune themselves to see the
artwork in a new way (coinciding with crying).
Romantic painting Montgomery (2003; also Miller, 1974) related the case of Caspar David
Friedrich, who played with 18th c. expectation of paintings as “picture
windows” which viewers can “step into,” instead blocking the gaze with a
hill or depicting meaningless voids. In a famous account, Heinrich von
Kleist, faced with a painting of a monk staring out to sea (see Figure 1),
reported finding himself left “with nothing but a frame as foreground,” and
only “infinity” to gaze upon (p. 58).
This forced a reconsideration of his expectations for his typical
way of addressing art, causing him to reporting that he felt as if his
“eyelids had been cut away” (p. 58).
Baroque/renaissance
painting
Magherini (1989; see also Elkins, 2001), considered several cases of
discrepancy from depicted mimetic content which question the self. She
related a tearful interaction between a “repressed” gay male viewer and
Rubens painting of a young man which caused a troubling arousal. This
caused a period of anxiety where he repeatedly revisited the work
attempting to reconcile or understand his reaction.
Tears arose, according to this review, when the man did
experience a realization of his previously denied sexual self. As
Magherini (in Elkins, p. 47) concluded, while “different people have
strong reactions to the same works of art,” response ultimately
comes down to “the [viewer’s] history” and subsequent
adjustment.
Post-modern
sculpture
Fraser (2006, p. 42), documented her experience with works of Fred
Sandback, composed of string strung to make the contours of geometric
shapes demarcating ephemeral space. The works, she noted, represented
such an “extremely reduced kind of art, art so devoid of anything that would
normally be considered expressive and affective” (p. 34), that they led her to
question art’s very existence. “For me, art [became] an impossibility. And if
art is impossible, then artists are also impossible, and I myself am
impossible” (p. 42).
She reported crying as result of a final revelation and change in
herself. “Just as art cannot exist outside of the field of art, I cannot
exist outside of the field of art, at least not as what I am, which is
an artist” (p. 42). She concluded (p. 34), we cry because we do
“not see the person or the object” which had been expected and
“must gradually accept the fact that [our] looking is in vain.” She
also questioned, would such an outcome be “an aesthetic
experience?”
Opera Poizat (1992) argued that tears arise for a listener when a singer attempts to
stretch a note past the range of human ability. The listener “dimly sense[s]
that the singer is trying to free themselves from the prison of words,” and
they hold (unrealistic) hope/expectation that the note can be sustained.
Tears arise “when a voice has almost made it, but gives out”
(p. 146) and the listener finds himself or herself alone in silence,
forced to reflect/give up.
Literature Moretti (1983; also Neale, 1986) argues that crying results from a plot
progression in which a reader has more information than a literary character.
The reader both identifies with character point of view, representing a
naïve/ideal world, while perceiving its untruth. The reader experiences
anxiety as the character moves closer to discovery and therefore forcing
loss of these expectations.
The reader cries at that point when a “sentence modifies the point
of view that had directed our reading,” forcibly “[re]organizing
expectations” (p. 159).
Music Sloboda (1985, 1991) argued that tears are caused by “creations and
violations of expectancy…within musical structure” (1991, p. 120). He
continues, tears are “reliably evoked by melodic appoggiaturas, or grace
notes, in which a note above or below the main tone precedes it,” causing a
listener “to anticipate an impending ending” (in Lutz, 1999, p. 258), and
“creating a certain amount of tension” (1991, p. 120). For example, “the
opening six bars of the 3rd movement” of Rachmaninov’s Second
Symphony is “a prototypical…‘tears’ passage” (1991, p. 115).
Crying then occurs “when the main tone is sounded” forcing either
release of expectation that the tone might not sound (in
happy/relief cases) or change/giving up if expectation is violated
(sad music) (1991, p. 120).
Theater Brooks (1976; see also Goffman, 1974 for discussion in public galleries)
gave an account of tears caused by the experience of an overwhelming
emotion or reaction to performance, and which gives one the urge to yell or
gesture. However, because one can only remain silent there is created a
“fault or gap” between expectations for response and ability to convey
emotion (p. 67).
Tears arise when one admits their inability of responding or
control. Frijda (1988, p. 351) notes, even in these cases, when
tears arise, it is from a switch to “awareness of [one’s own] state of
action readiness” and ultimately “some change” in expectations.
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
Expectation + discrepancy Self/schema transformation
Beauty, perfection,
overwhelming/
sublime stimuli (1)
Even though such reactions are often tied to harmony or moments of
pleasure/being overwhelmed, here there is still discussion of discrepancy.
Miceli and Castelfranchi (2003, p. 260) note viewers, faced with a
particularly profound or too perfect stimulus, may experience a “sense of
contrast between one’s experience…and one’s [own] perceived ‘smallness’,
ordinariness, and imperfection…together with one’s helpless need to
comprehend and express the whole.” Elkins (2001, p. 20) adds, “viewers
see [or experience] more than they expect.” Alternatively, one may again not
be able to correctly control their composure or properly respond.
Tears arise when one becomes aware of and acknowledges their
own self deficiency or imperfection and gives up the attempt to
respond. Koestler (in Lutz, 1999, p. 246) concludes, “there is
nothing to be done, no action to be taken, just passive surrender.”
These experiences, Koestler [in Frey and Langseth, 1985, p. 92]
concludes, are always “self-transcending.”
Perfection,
overwhelming/
sublime stimuli (2)
Roald (2009, p. 121) offers another explanation. She claims that such
encounters present a self/world just on the horizon of what one previously
has conceived and “calls” us to “accept this experience as [our] own.” For
example from an interview with a viewer of a sculpture by Barabara
Hepworth. “I found it overwhelming…It touched me, and I became
agitated…[I was thinking] this is incredible, what is it? What is it with the
form?”
Roald argues that by then acknowledging and “accepting” the
experience as real, the individual can expand their sense of self to
account for the new phenomenon. Ultimately “the subject calls
upon itself to change” (p. 156). Roald also explicitly linked this
event to aesthetic experience.
Happy endings (A) Miceli and Castelfranchi (2003; also Weiss, 1952) note antecedent
discrepancy, claiming “what seems typical of crying for joy is the existence
of some prior worry and consequent relief” (p. 257).
Tears tied to final correspondence between reality and
expectations, allowed via external changes that allow one to adopt
a hoped for schema that had been incongruent.
Happy endings (B) Alternatively, Neale (1986, p. 21) argues for overt dissonance and “negative”
change, contending tears come “at the cost of the loss of the story and the
fantasy.” He notes that fantasy has an element of impossibility. “The fantasy
is fulfilled, but the fulfillment is precisely implausible... It can…last only as
long as the fiction.”
Crying ties to revision of expectations when the story ends—“a
mark of fulfillment... and its loss—the story and the fulfillment are
soon both over.” Barbalet (2005, p. 128–131) concludes, while
“joyful weeping [may] register a positive transformation of self, just
as tears of suffering register loss as a negative transformation of
self,” in all cases, crying “can be regarded as essentially
expressing transformation.”
Religious
experience
James (1958, p. 213) tied “the gift of tears” to religious experience, noting
that they occur when one has held false beliefs or “moral stagnancies”
(p. 213).
Tears arise when, through “gradual growth or by a crisis” (p. 213),
one must “give up…let go (their) hold” creating “change in terms
of the old self” culminating with final “conversion” (pp. 169–175).
“To get to it, a critical point must usually be passed, a corner
turned within one. Something must give way” (p. 171).
aDivision of cases based on two-factor theory of crying (Efran and Spangler, 1979). Explicit mention of self change/“transformations” in italics.
FIGURE 1 | Examples of tear-inducing art. (A) Caspar David Friedrich, Der
Mönch am Meer, 1808–1810. (Oil on canvas, 110× 171.5 cm. public domain
image, Wikimedia commons). (B) illustration depicting archetypal Fred
Sandback work (image created by first author).
art evaluation, understanding and emotional arousal (Pelowski
and Akiba, 2011). Therefore, tears may also offer a frame
for organizing numerous contextual factors in experience. By
connecting crying to parallel discussion of insight, articulated via
art, this discussion may also allow new understanding of crying
itself.
Combined Model of Crying and
“Aesthetic”/Insight Experience
As noted above, we (Pelowski and Akiba, 2009, 2011) recently
proposed a cognitive model for art viewing that can serve
as a frame for considering crying’s perceptual importance.
This model follows a recent trend in discussion of art
viewing which explores this process from an information-
processing or cognitive basis (e.g., Lasher et al., 1983; Leder
et al., 2004). It addresses the cognitive process of schema-
/self-change argued to be crying’s cognitive basis, while also
making connection to insightful/transforming or “aesthetic”
experience. Even more, this model incorporates the two
key elements noted for crying—discrepancy and triggered
reassessment—as key demarcative points for understanding
experience.
The model is shown in Figure 2, and can be read from top
to bottom. This also incorporates the key crying factors (blue
circles) with arrows connecting to the relevant model sections.
As in the crying discussion, the model’s essential mechanism
centers on the process of forming and matching expectations or
schema to a “reality” presented by a stimulus. Themodel however
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FIGURE 2 | Cognitive Flow Model of schema change and
insightful/“aesthetic” experience, with major factors of crying
highlighted. The main flow model (based on Pelowski and Akiba, 2011) is
depicted on the right, and can be read from top to bottom, with major stages
denoted on the far left and three posited outcomes depicted in gray boxes.
The “hierarchical self image” (adapted by the author from Carver, 1996),
upon which the cognitive progression is expected to be based, is shown in
the top- and bottom-left circular insets. Main crying elements (from the
two-factor crying theory, adapted from Efran and Spangler, 1979) are shown
in blue.
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expands discussion to five stages, with three outcomes, each with
specific importance for perception/art.
Stage One: Pre-expectations and Self Image
The model begins with explicit discussion of schema/self. As
also noted for crying, before perceptual activity viewers are
argued to hold a set of postulates directing behavior, conceptions
or expectations regarding all life elements, as well as likely
response to the outcomes of interaction. Building from the
crying theory, these postulates can and should be given specific
form and specifically tied into a broader conception of the self.
Following Carver (1996), these postulates collectively can be
said to combine to form an individual’s “ideal self image” and
might best be conceptualized in a hierarchical arrangement (top-
left inset, Figure 2) with a collection of ideal concepts that the
individual aspires to forming the core of the self, branching off
into goals or schema for their pursuit and reinforcement (“do
goals”) and further divided into local expectations or schema
for specific behaviors and perceptions in individual tasks (“be
someone connected to art” > “do understand artworks” > “find
meaning in a particular painting,” etc.). In this way, all behavior,
through attachment between low-level schema and the core self,
entails application of some self-postulates, and forms the basis for
the following stages.
Cognitive Mastery
First, upon encountering a stimulus, whether life event or work
of art, individuals immediately employ this hierarchical self in the
first main model stage. In a process called “cognitive mastery”
by Leder et al. (2004) in their own model of art perception,
individuals attempt to directly control interaction by classifying,
evaluating and responding based upon pre-expectations and in
such a way as to reinforce the existing schema and self. In
practice, while a viewer of the movie noted above might evaluate
a character, consider their life situation and future prospects
and engage with the story based upon a pre-conceived notion
of how such a character’s life should proceed, viewers of a
painting might evaluate a work for its semiotic or conceptual
meaning or appraise formal elements, based upon what one
expects or have been trained to perceive in art. This occurs while
individuals may simultaneously observe their own reactions, or
consider implications of assessed meaning, so that these too fit
and reinforce the self.
However, while success at this stage may constitute an
evolutionarily-derived goal of processing, and—as it leads to ease
and understanding—may itself be pleasurable or rewarding, if
experience does end in cognitive mastery it is also essentially an
act of circularity. This requires viewers to assimilate perceptions
or actions to existing schema, and thus occurs at the cost of new
perceptions or concepts. The ground for this claim is connected
to strategies for protecting the hierarchical self (see Pelowski and
Akiba, 2011 for review). As was mentioned above, viewers use a
wide range of measures to defend against threat to the self image
by diminishing potential for discrepant results. Individuals are
also predisposed to attend to information that fits their self model
and to ignore that which does not (also Epstein, 1973; Lawler and
Thye, 1999). This is often coupled with pre-attitudes—a stimulus
is “not important,” one does not need to control or understand—
that aid in diminishing need for engagement. In turn, experience
that ends in this stage becomes a self-protectionary, “facile”
interpretation—what Dewey (1980, p. 24) called “a dead spot
in experience.” It is therefore at this point that both art and
crying models raise importance of discrepancy. This represents
cognition of something outside existing schema, and acts as a
prompt to knock an individual out of overt control.
Secondary Control
When discrepancy does occur and cannot be easily assimilated,
viewers enter into the period of anxiety and tension in which they
fight or repress discrepancy, and which was also noted by crying
models. While these models only note basic need for this period,
this stage, called “secondary control” by Rothbaum et al. (1982),
also marks the second possible outcome of experience, with key
importance in terms of appraisal/understanding. Where before a
viewer had structured a task as an exercise in self-reinforcement,
this stage carries with it an implicit acceptance of insufficiency
and need for protecting the self. According to Folkman et al.
(1986, p. 1000), the individual, on some level, has “appraised (the)
encounter as having to be accepted.” Yet acceptance, because it
would involve refutation of schema, would endanger the self-
image. Viewers are left with a choice betweenmaintaining a sense
of mastery in actions or conceptions or relative importance of
the stimulus or context. Because the latter is not often tied to
higher-level goals, individuals typically discard or diminish the
environment and in so doing preserve the integrity of their own,
failed, self. This typically involves a progression of strategies, also
noted in crying: (1) re-classification of stimulus/context (“the
doctor is wrong,” “it’s not art”); (2) physical escape—leaving,
fidgeting, shifting attention; and finally (3) mental withdrawal,
reducing impact of a stimulus by disengaging it from one’s
self—“it’s only art” (see also Steele et al., 1993).
Crying literature also notes self-protection. Beyond common
discussion of repression of a life event that portends unwanted
change, Kagan (1967) and Suls (1972) also note forced smiling
and laughter in individuals who end in secondary control, and
an inverse correlation to crying. Goffman (1974, p. 353) has tied
these responses to self-protectionary re-classification, “guising”
a situation as lacking any seriousness and therefore threat. This
outcome is also often coupled with negative emotions—sadness,
anger (Silvia, 2009)—as well as negative assessments (Becker,
1982), and which are often noted with difficult events or works
of art (Pelowski and Akiba, 2011).
Self-awareness and Schema Change
It is only in cases when individuals do not escape that they come
to the last demarcative point of this progression. In these cases,
individuals find themselves in the intractable position mentioned
above—unable to directly resolve discrepancy through direct
mastery and also unable to disengage. This position is likely
directly due to relative self-importance. For individuals who find
themselves in an interaction where success constitutes a core
self component, the environment cannot be easily dismissed or
discarded without reflecting poorly on the efficacy of one’s self.
This intractable position can then be resolved in one of two ways.
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Either conditions of the environment change allowing a positive
resolution—asmight be expected in cases of crying events (Miceli
and Castelfranchi, 2003). Transversely, where external reprieve
cannot be found one is instead left with no choice but to seek
perceptual or expectation adjustment.
While crying discussion most often frames this adjustment as
a point of defeat, forcing a switch from repression to acceptance,
this outcome is also central to discussion of insight. Essentially
what is required is a new means of addressing the discrepancy or
object itself. In turn, the means of accomplishing this is through
a switch in one’s manner of evaluation from direct attempt at
control to metacognitive appraisal. As put by Torrance (1979,
p. 182), within this switch one “looks outside” an intractable
problem to the entire “system” or basis for engagement, thereby
allowing for substantive changes to the entire ground (i.e., the
self structure) for their perceptions. This in turn requires some
amount of self-awareness. Self-awareness serves as a catalyst for
inducing an outcome in a discrepant encounter (Steele et al.,
1993). While leading individuals who entered a situation already
employing self-protectionary expectations to abort through
reclassification/escape (Ingram, 1990), it induces individuals
who cannot abort to undergo reflection, focusing attention on
personal limitations, increasing perceived uncontrollability, and
causing schema revision (Rothbaum et al., 1982).
As was also mentioned for crying, this switch is often also tied
to some external “trigger” that does unavoidably consummate
previous failed attempts at control. To take examples from crying
literature: the death of a character, “divorce papers in the mail,”
“seeing mother in hospital hooked up to machines”; or even
happy change, “learned Mom’s x-rays showed nothing serious”
(Frey and Langseth, 1985, p. 85). However, as discussed in
Pelowski and Akiba (2011), the key element for such perceptions
is arguably ability to make one aware of their actions or
expectations, thus forcing perception back to the self. As often
occurs in context of art, self-focus can also be triggered by
numerous environmental factors without change in a stimulus—
a mirror, audience, the sound of one’s voice; even a painting
“watching you” (see also Duval and Wicklund, 1972)—all of
which may function to shift control from assimilation to a
metacognitive plain.
“Aesthetic”/Insightful Experience
By acknowledging and reflecting on one’s previous actions or
conception one can then make modifications, leading to the final
stage. This too may take a number of forms: from admitting
impossibility of some previous expectation, to modifying one’s
perceptual approach (see painting in Table 1), to undertaking a
higher level reassessment of concepts. In each case, via the tie
of lower level schema to higher “be” and “do” goals, one can be
said to alter some component of their hierarchical self structure
(lower inset, Figure 2), therefore creating a “transformation”
noted above.When considered from a perspective of information
processing, the key importance of this adjustment is that it allows
one to essentially reset engagement and re-enter the cognitive
mastery stage while employing a modified set of schema. This
may allow for improved/deepened interaction or for attention
to previously repressed elements (Sarason et al., 1996). In this
way, viewers can be said to learn from within their interaction
or to arrive at novelty, epiphany or insight. The resetting, if it
is particularly profound, is also tied to experience of harmony
as well as catharsis, pleasure (Steele et al., 1993). Therefore, in
the context of art it is this outcome that Dewey (1951) originally
called the “aesthetic phase” of experience.
It is also this outcome that would coincide with crying.
With discrepancy, a viewer is argued to experience sympathetic
nervous system activation—increasing heart rate, electrodermal
response. This further increases with movement to secondary
control. In turn, the moment of schema change has been shown
to coincide with both sympathetic and parasympathetic response.
Gross et al. (1994, p. 466) contend, it may in fact “be precisely this
coordinated activation . . . that (can) make (this) such a potent
physiological (experience).” This is then followed by a period
of parasympathetic latency, where crying literature as well notes
feelings of catharsis, pleasure (Cornelius, 1997), and tears.
Empirical Importance of Crying Within the Model
of Aesthetic Experience
This frame then raises a number of suggestions regarding crying’s
empirical significance. First, as outlined in Figure 2, the model
gives a format for achieving adjusted perception, involving five
major stages. These are argued to occur in order, and one is
required to move through the full progression in order to arrive
at the aesthetic, and potentially tearful, end. It is essentially
in getting to the final outcome, overcoming strategies of self-
protection or bypassing secondary control, that the above-cited
authors argued to be the goal of experience. This is also an
important conclusion in art, which is often designed to elicit such
responses (see Pelowski et al., 2014 for review).
This is not to say that schema change would always end in
crying, or that the stages are so pronounced in all cases. The
process of self-application would occur in a continuous cycle of
interactions, with constant small adjustments. However, given
the cognitive basis, whenever crying does occur it should coincide
with some schema/self revision, and thus theoretically denote
an insight experience2. Nor again do discrepancy/tears need
to arise due to analysis of information. Ferreira et al. (2001)
note that individuals perform numerous levels of processing
when encountering a stimulus. Cognitive mastery involves a
series of cyclic checks, with an individual evaluating in parallel
the informational content, impact of information on the self,
and one’s behavior or response (see Figure 3 for a description
of several such assessments), with any element able to induce
discrepancy. Labott and Martin (1988) add that even knowing
a conclusion, such as in a previously-viewed movie, does not
impede crying response. Rather, to the extent that viewers
2Although outside the scope of this paper, in evolutionary discussion there is
speculation that would connect function of crying precisely to protection of the
individual from distractions impeding an “aesthetic” phase. Crying may signal to
unfamiliar others that one should be left alone, or, for intimate others crying may
signal need for support while one withdraws and re-evaluates (Neale, 1986; Hill
andMartin, 1997). Alternatively, Barbalet (2005, p. 139) frames crying directly in a
personal context, contending that the “function of weeping [is] to communicate
to the self an incident of transformation,” and acting to steer individuals away
from other obligations thereby reinforcing cognitive processes of reflection/re-
organization.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1006
Pelowski Tears and transformation
FIGURE 3 | Varieties of assessment that may lead to discrepancy within the cognitive mastery stage.
allow themselves to suspend disbelief, form personally-important
connections, and retrace the cognitive process, they may re-
experience the same end. In addition, another main addition of
the model is its explanation for two other, earlier outcomes—(1)
facile control and (2) negative or discrepant self protection—
which are also major outcomes in need of explanation within
perception and especially art, and which may preclude crying.
Perhaps most important, when we do return to consideration
of art or other static media, is the number of other factors that
may be organized with the model and crying response. Because
outcomes and their underlying stages occur in order, the model
can be used to form hypotheses for a number of behavioral
measures which coincide with, and partially define, each stage.
These are listed in Figure 4. By exploring these factors via self-
report, and by using crying as well as other main aspects in
the two-factor model as points of demarcation, this may allow
a frame for identifying specific outcomes of experience.
Emotion
First, while it is a core argument that cognitive rather than
emotional processes are the cause of crying, emotion and other
experiential factors, may provide one of the best measures for
this progression. Specifically, the model proposes correlations
between crying and: (1) anxiety, tension, confusion, stemming
from initial discrepancy; followed by (2) need to escape/abort,
related to secondary control. In the case of crying, this should be
followed by (3) self-awareness, motive assessment, and awareness
of triggers; finally concluding with (4) relief as well as epiphany or
insight, marking the aesthetic end. On the other hand, experience
that does not end in crying would be expected to show a halt
in this progression at either cognitive mastery—with lack of
confusion, anxiety, and later factors—or at aborted secondary
control—with initial confusion/anxiety but no epiphany or self-
awareness. These additional key factors (i.e., confusion, self
awareness, and epiphany), marking proposed major points of
transition within the model are also highlighted in blue in the
right column of Figure 4 (see also Pelowski et al., 2014). This
contention is also supported by previous literature on crying,
which does show that, following discrepancy, inability to revise
expectations and complete schema change is notable for its
inverse correlation with tears (Dombeck et al., 1996). Literature
also suggests that viewers who eventually cry may show greater
sympathetic response in initial evaluation (Gross et al., 1994;
Rottenberg et al., 2002), suggesting discrepancy within this stage.
Appraisal
The same main divisions should also be found in art/object
appraisal. Experience that ends in mastery should show either a
rather neutral evaluation or negative devaluation, diminishing—
as self-protection—its potential threat. This might also arise in
pre-expectations, with viewers in the facile category holding
attitudes—art is not important, and has no connection to their
life—diminishing need to actively engage. Given discrepancy,
self-protection is expected to become even more pronounced,
and experience ending in secondary control should show
correlation to negative evaluation. This may also manifest in
devaluation of the “potency” and “activity” of a stimulus, as
evaluated via the Semantic Differential technique (Osgood et al.,
1957). This approach, in which individuals use a number of
adjectival pairs (e.g., good–bad) for assessments, has been shown
to be an effective means of considering nuanced evaluation
(Leder et al., 2005; Silvia, 2005). Even more, adjectival scales
are routinely shown to coalesce along three factors—regarding
relative potency, activity and hedonic quality (evaluation). In
turn, measures—e.g., “weak,” “superficial”—that routinely refer
to potency/activity areas have been argued to suggest amount
of adjustment made or that must be made to a stimulus
and therefore relative importance/danger to the self (Carroll,
1959). Berlyne (1974), in the context of art, also notes that
negative evaluation with potency factors suggests unresolved
“uncertainty” between perception and expectations, which might
especially surface in secondary control. Becker (1982) also
argues that secondary control should tie to devaluation of
hedonic aspects—beauty, goodness—again reflecting protection
of the self. Crying, on the other hand, may coincide with
positive hedonic, potency and activity assessment, reflecting
acknowledged ability of a stimulus to profoundly affect
one’s self.
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FIGURE 4 | Cognitive Flow Model of insightful/“aesthetic”
experience with hypothesized factors for each stage. Posited
emotion, artwork appraisals, mode of meaning assessment, physiological
reactions, and self image-related processes are shown on the right side,
corresponding to the model stage at which they would be expected.
Emotional factors posited to be main empirical indicators of each
outcome highlighted in blue. Feeling like crying/physical tears responses
shown in red.
Meaning/Understanding
Outcomes should also involve three distinct approaches to
assessed meaning: (1) initial evaluation in cognitive mastery
involving, in the case of art, direct appraisals of formal
elements—mimetic, semiotic, historical; followed by (2) a period
of meaninglessness in secondary control; and (3) concluding
with a new interpretation involving a fundamental shift from
form/information to assessment involving self-reference. In the
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arts, this change may often take on a specifically important
character. Forced from direct informational analysis, viewersmay
adopt what Dewey (1980) has called an “experiential” approach,
whereby the “meaning” of a work comes to be equated to
this entire process of change and personal impact or stimulus-
induced insight or learning (see for example, Fraser, 2006
above). Within discussion of art, such progression from direct
or unsuccessful interpretations to an enjoyment based on the
act of looking or impact on the self has been given as one of
the main goals of art education/experience (Pelowski and Akiba,
2011). In crying discussion as well, Martin and Labott (1991)
have shown correlation between tears and deepened recall of
individual experience, suggesting such connection.
Schema/Self Change
We also have proposed specific evidence for self transformation.
Literature suggests that self change might again be meaningfully
recorded by use of Semantic Differential, in this case regarding
pre- and post-experience comparison in assessments of the term
“yourself.” Miceli and Castelfranchi (2003; see also Bem, 1967)
argue that the result of a self/schema transformation, occurring
as a viewer acknowledges discrepancy and gives up control,
might be specifically reflected in a reduction of potency in this
evaluation.
“Feeling Like Crying” vs. Physical Tears
Finally, the above distinctions may be indicated by simply
“feeling like crying.” Studies (Williams, 1982; Ross and
Mirowsky, 1984; Vingerhoets et al., 1997) suggest that
individuals, especially males, often arrive at the point of feeling
like crying yet repress actual tears, presumably because of social
stigma, and to the extent that repression becomes so established
that this can occur without conscious effort. It is therefore feeling
like crying, rather than overt weeping, that is argued to mark
culmination at schema change (Efran and Spangler, 1979; Labott
and Martin, 1988). Studies comparing overt tears and “feeling
like” crying (Lombardo et al., 1983; Kraemer and Hastrup, 1986)
or different intensities—“weeping” vs. “moist eyes” (Williams and
Morris, 1996)—as well show no differences in elicited emotion or
cognitive elements.
Materials and Methods: Study 1
To conclude this paper, the above model hypotheses were applied
in three exploratory studies within museums, beginning with
perhaps the most notably tear-inducing contemporary artwork.
The artist Mark Rothko is an important representative of
the American abstract expressionist movement of the 1960’s.
His paintings are often noted for their beauty, and are a
particular draw among many viewers in museums of Modern art
(Elderfield, 2005). What makes him compelling here, however,
is anecdotal relation to crying. While Rothko is a fixture of
Modern Art museums, one particular gallery—an octagonal
room holding 14 of his paintings in Houston Texas—the so-
called “Rothko Chapel” has also taken on a particular notoriety
for tear elicitation. According to Elkins (2001, p. 4), “it is
likely that the majority of people who have wept” over 20th
century art have done so in front of these paintings. Even more
interesting is the fact that the reasons for these reactions are not
immediately clear. The artworks, ∼2 × 3 m purple/black color
fields (Figure 5), although representative of Rothko’s mature
style, are also quite simple. While conceived as “painting” in
the classical sense, they do not portray any particular mimetic
depiction, and critics agree that the paintings often lose any
semblance of such mimetic meaning, eventually coming to be
viewed not as pictures but as “just” paint (Jones, 2002). This
reaction, however, when connected to our model, may be the
driving force for the experience.
As described by several writers (Nodelman, 1997; Elkins, 2001;
Elderfield, 2005), upon entering the room, due to the paintings’
monumental quality and minute brushstrokes, viewers often
have a sense of profound significance. As viewers attempt to fit
the paintings together and understand their collective meaning,
the paintings’ redundancy and opacity can reject mimetic
interpretation, leading to a “turning point” between escape
or reconsideration. In the latter case, experience then comes
to parallel the above discussion. Eventually, notes Elderfield
(p. 112), “we are reminded that we are alone in front of the
paintings.” “Frustrated and thrown back to yourself,” Nodelman
(p. 330) adds, viewers “become the center of the room. . . . (The
art) forces disturbing questions about the nature of the self
and its relation to the world.” And this induces an interpretive
change in the viewer, in which “the experiential structure of
the installation (itself) is transformed” (p. 342). As a comment
in the visitors’ log concludes (in (Barnes, 1989); see also
Figure 6), summing up this paper’s discussion, "being in the
room is an emotional experience in which you either face your
innermost self ”—and potentially feel like crying—“or leave in
incomprehension.”
The room itself was also especially suited to controlled
empirical study. It contained only a bench and the paintings
with no extraneous information—labels, audio guide, windows,
artworks—essentially duplicating a laboratory setting. The
abstract paintings, because of their absence of mimetic content,
were also unlikely to evoke highly personal associations that
might cloud between-subject analyses. This allowed better
targeting of the posited underlying cognitive processes (Jacobsen
et al., 2006). As noted above, the museum setting was also an
important element. As opposed to movies or other temporal
media that might use a story to evoke crying response, in
the case of static art, the laboratory—with digitally reproduced
paintings—is not likely to evoke such a personal, powerful
reaction, necessitating focus on a more natural, spontaneous
experience (Jacobsen, 2006).
Participants
To investigate interaction with the art, 21 individuals (Mean
age = 48; 11 females) were recruited on site, constituting all
patrons who consented to participate from among all those who
visited within the testing period (∼60% acceptance). Selection
was also confined to only single or paired adults, following Packer
and Ballantyne (2002) who suggest that it is only these individuals
who are likely to engage to a sufficient depth to routinely allow for
the targeted experience.
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FIGURE 5 | Study locations. (A) the Rothko Chapel, Houston Texas. (B) Rothko Room, Kawamura DIC Prefectural Museum of Art, Japan (prior to 2007
remodeling). (C) Floor plan for “mark Rothko, the late paintings,” Sep. 2008—Jan. 2009. Tate Modern, London. (All photos/illustrations by first author).
Procedure
Procedure followed a method previously applied with success
in museum studies (Pelowski et al., 2012, 2014), designed to
allow the capturing of a “natural” experience without intrusion
from researcher or apparatus. Participants were approached by a
researcher in the courtyard before entering the building, which
contained only the gallery and foyer. The researcher explained
that they were conducting research on the experiences had with
the art, and asked guests if they would be interested in answering
a survey following their viewing. Those who consented were
given a pre-test, targeting general art expectations (requiring
about 10min, seeMeasures below). Participants were then asked
to enter the gallery and view the art in whatever manner and for
whatever duration that they desired. Once finished, participants
returned to the testing location where they completed a post-test
(∼20min) and a brief exit interview. Participants were timed,
however they were not observed, inside the gallery. Access was
free and visitors were not compensated for participation. This
study, and the following Studies 2 and 3, were approved by the
ethics committee of Nagoya University and by the participating
museums.
Measures
The measures for the study were designed to allow investigation
of two main questions: (1) was it possible to record evidence
for feeling like crying when viewing the art, and how would
individuals respond to this question? (2) would participant
answers regarding the crying and other experiential/evaluative
factors show patterns of responses suggesting a full progression
through the hypothesized model stages, and which might suggest
correlation between “aesthetic” and crying experience? Further,
could a demarcation be made between the crying outcome and
other “facile” or “abortive” outcomes when viewing the art?
Because this study was largely exploratory, the above questions
were assessed via questionnaires containing a large number of
measures, targeting the multiple factors posited above. These
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FIGURE 6 | Comments in the visitor’s log book noting crying and
self-referential or experience-based interpretation of artwork meaning,
Rothko Chapel, Houston Texas. (photo provided by curator to first author,
2006).
are discussed below, with measures listed in Tables 2 and 3.
This also meant that the study was intended from the onset
as exploratory, with statistical examination used largely as a
guide for a qualitative assessment of the interaction with this
specific art.
Pre-expectations
The pre-viewing questionnaire consisted of a series of 5-point
scales (“1” = strongly disagree, “2” = disagree, “3” = neither
agree nor disagree) addressing expectations for viewing, art
understanding/comfort and relation between art and self, based
on those reviewed in Pelowski and Akiba (2011).
Artwork Appraisal, Self Appraisal
The pre-test also asked viewers to evaluate the term “yourself ”
via 22 adjectival pairs (listed in Table 3) separated by 7-point
bipolar scale (1 = “very good,” 2 = “quite good,” 3 = “slightly
good,” 4 = “neither good nor bad”). Upon viewing the artworks,
viewers were then asked to again evaluate themselves, as well
as “the artwork,” in the post-test using the same pairs. These
scales were based on the Semantic Differential instrument of
Osgood et al. (1957). As reviewed in above, this technique, in
addition to measuring the connotative meaning of objects or
concepts, was selected because of its applicability for assessing
relative level of self-protection employed in interacting with
a stimulus. When considering changes in self-evaluation, the
technique is also argued to have specific efficacy as an indicator of
transformation/schema-change, and also has widespread cross-
cultural use especially with art (e.g., Tanaka et al., 1963; Berlyne,
1974). The adjective pairs were selected from the original lists of
Osgood et al. (1957), with the goal of providing a representative
range of scales with high loadings among the main Evaluative,
Potency and Activity regions.
Emotional/Experiential Factors
The post-test also included unipolar 9-point scales (listed in
Table 2) eliciting self-report on emotional and experiential
factors mentioned as potential components in aesthetic/tearful
experience [e.g., “while I was inside the room, I experienced
(factor)”]. In this case, an answer of “0” corresponded to “no such
feeling,” answers from “1”–“8” corresponded to some incidence
as well as relative magnitude, with “8” signifying “the most
intense such feeling in my life” (following Ekman et al., 1980;
Carstensen et al., 2000).
Feeling Like Crying
The above section also included the term “I cried or felt like
crying.” This was chosen, rather than attempt to monitor actual
shedding of tears in the gallery, as our crying measure because of
the desire to maintain a natural viewing experience. In addition,
as discussed above, this approach was chosen because of ability of
individuals to arrive at schema change/crying but repress physical
tears. Pairing of self-report with 9-point scale has also previously
been employed by multiple studies (Kraemer and Hastrup, 1986;
Martin and Labott, 1991;Williams andMorris, 1996), which have
found no incidence of under- or mis-reporting when compared
to physiological measures.
Order of survey scales, as well as survey sections, was
randomized between participants. An alpha of 0.05 was set for
all results.
Results: Study 1
The art experience took on average 15.5min (SD = 8.3).
No significant interactions were found between demographic
criteria and other measures. In addition, no subjects expressed
knowledge of the anecdotal tie between the art and crying or
any other above-noted reactions. While most had heard of the
artist, 66% were first time visitors. No significant ties were found
between foreknowledge or number of previous visits and answer
to the survey questions. At the same time, 43% of subjects
reported some magnitude of feeling like crying when viewing the
art (M = 4.1, SD = 2.2). This response was then used as the
focus for subsequent analysis.
First, correlation analyses were conducted in order to assess
the basic relation of feeling like crying (hereafter, “FLC”) with
other emotion and evaluation factors. Due to the ordinal nature
of the scales, non-parametric analyses were used for this and
all of the following procedures. Following current best practice
in exploratory research (see Rothman, 1990), these analyses do
not include correction for multiple assessments, but include both
effect sizes and confidence intervals. The correlation analyses
used Kendall tau-b, which is argued to provide a more accurate
and conservative test than similar Spearman rank-order (Kendall
and Gibbons, 1990). Results are shown in Table 2. Significant
positive correlation was found between FLC and tension, need
to escape, change in mood, as well as self-awareness, epiphany,
relief, and both happiness and sadness. In artwork appraisal
(Table 3), positive correlation was found between FLC and
finding the art more meaningful, as well as with evaluating
the art as more precise, sincere, lively, clear, intimate, unique,
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TABLE 2 | Correlation of reported “felt like crying” and other experiential/emotional factors in three encounters with museum art.
Rothko chapel, USA (N = 21) Tate modern, England (N = 28) Kawamura DIC, Japan (N = 30)
τB 95% CI
b
τB 95% CI τB 95% CI
COGNITIVE MASTERY/DISCREPANCYa
Anxiety 0.252 [−0.16, 0.59] 0.159 [−0.17, 0.46] −0.179 [−0.44, 0.11]
Confusion 0.239 [−0.13, 0.55] 0.066 [−0.26, 0.37] −0.204 [−0.47, 0.09]
Tension 0.506*** [0.23, 0.71] 0.073 [−0.27, 0.40] ------ ------
Surprise −0.131 [−0.48,0.25] ------ ------ ------ ------
SECONDARY CONTROL
Need to leave 0.604*** [0.41,0.75] 0.299 [0.04,0.52] −0.025 [−0.33, 0.29]
SELF-AWARE REFLECTION
Self-awareness 0.660*** [0.53, 0.76] 0.330** [0.09, 0.53] 0.410*** [0.15, 0.62]
Felt being watched 0.088 [−0.27, 0.43] 0.293 [0.04, 0.51] 0.322** [0.01, 0.58]
Changed my mind 0.000 [−0.36, 0.36] 0.099 [−0.22, 0.40] ------ ------
Examined motives for viewing 0.065 [−0.32, 0.44] −0.076 [−0.40,0.26] ------ ------
Felt the paintings watching me 0.091 [−0.31, 0.46] ------ ------ ------ ------
Aware of my actions 0.166 [−0.17, 0.47] ------ ------ ------ ------
AESTHETIC PHASE/INSIGHT
Epiphany 0.469*** [0.22, 0.66] 0.529*** [0.32, 0.69] 0.339** [0.05, 0.58]
Understood artist intention 0.212 [−0.16, 0.53] 0.394** [0.17, 0.58] 0.282* [0.01, 0.51]
Sadness 0.421** [0.14, 0.64] 0.234 [−0.08, 0.51] 0.233 [−0.06, 0.49]
Happiness 0.382** [0.13, 0.59] 0.243 [−0.01, 0.47] 0.224 [−0.02, 0.45]
Relief 0.427** [0.20, 0.61] 0.197 [−0.14, 0.49] ------ ------
Time 0.231 [−0.06, 0.48] 0.437** [0.18, 0.64]
Ratings made on 9-point scale (0 = “no such feeling,” 8 = “the most intense such feeling in my life.”). *(Bold) Correlation significant at p < 0.05 (2-tailed), non-parametric Kendall tau-b.
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
aDivisions based on proposed stages of aesthetic experience model (Pelowski and Akiba, 2011).
bConfidence Intervals calculations based on Asymptotic Standard Error.
serious, and profound. Although not significant, there was also
a trend between FLC and finding the art more beautiful and good
(p < 0.10).
In order to begin assessing clustering of the above factors,
viewers were then separated based on two elements—confusion
and feeling like crying—argued to demarcate the major outcomes
of processing experience. This led to three main divisions: (1)
those who reported neither confusion nor feeling like crying
(hereafter “no-confusion, no-FLC”), argued to correspond to the
outcome of initial “cognitive mastery” (n = 6); (2) “confusion,
no-FLC,” reflecting a conclusion in aborted “secondary control”
(n = 6); and (3) those with confusion who did feel like
crying (“confusion, FLC,” n = 8), potentially reflecting the
insightful/aesthetic outcome. Again, it was posited that FLC
without confusion would be unlikely (here n = 1). Confusion
was chosen because it was expected to best indicate a discrepancy
in cognitive assessment, although anxiety returned similar
findings.
While these divisions result in quite small groupings, and
thus extra care should be taken if making inferences, this did
produce some noteworthy results. Findings show an almost even
distribution into the three groups argued for in this paper.
In turn, reporting feeling like crying was concomitant with
discrepancy or confusion. Only one individual reporting FLC
without confusion. This individual’s responses largely resembled
those of non-criers. The “confusion, no-FLC” and “confusion,
FLC” subgroups also showed similarly high magnitudes of
this feeling. At the same time, Kruskal-Wallis comparison of
mean ranks between the three main subgroups indicated several
significant differences. As shown in Table 4, differences were
found for reported self-awareness, with post hoc Mann-Whitney
comparison between subgroups showing significant difference
between the latter “FLC, confusion” outcome and both other no-
FLC groups. Significant differences were also found for feeling
the paintings watching me, argued to be a potential trigger, and
showing lowest total for the “no-confusion, no-FLC” group and
higher for “confusion, no-FLC” and “confusion, FLC” outcomes.
Post-hoc comparison for “no-confusion” vs. both “confusion”
groups was also significant. Similar results were also found
for happiness and epiphany, with posthoc comparison in the
latter factor showing significant differences between the “no-
confusion” and the “FLC” outcomes. Nonparametric Levene’s
test of variance of homogeneity for all factors showed no
violations.
Because of the observed main division between those
reporting/not reporting FLC, and in order to provide
more robust group sizes, simple comparison was also made
between FLC/non-FLC outcomes (Table 5). This also revealed
significance regarding the same factors as above. Those
reporting FLC also had significantly higher need for escape,
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TABLE 3 | Correlation of “feeling like crying” with artwork evaluation in three encounters with museum art.
Rothko chapel, USA Kawamura, Japan Tate modern, London
(N = 21) (N = 30) (N = 28)
τB 95% CI
c
τB 95% CI τB 95% CI
EVALUATIVE SCALESa
Good: bad −0.325‡b [−0.51, 0.10] −0.441*** [−0.61, −0.23] −0.423*** [−0.58, 0.24]
Beautiful: ugly −0.365‡ [−0.65, 0.00] −0.531*** [−0.66, −0.37] −0.456*** [−0.60, −0.28]
Meaningful: meaningless −0.382* [−0.62, −0.07] −0.394** [−0.59, −0.15] −0.613*** [−0.71, −0.49]
Happy: sad −0.067 [−0.36, 0.24] ------ ------ ------ ------
POTENCY SCALESa
Intimate: remote −0.385* [−0.62, −0.09] −0.384** [−0.60, −0.12] −0.18 [−0.46, 0.14]
Sincere: insincere −0.558** [−0.69, −0.39] −0.177 [−0.40, 0.07] −0.374** [−0.37, 0.24]
Deep: shallow −0.062 [−0.45, 0.35] −0.251 [−0.49, 0.02] −0.307* [−0.56, −0.15]
Vague: precise −0.519** [0.31, 0.68] −0.017 [−0.24, 0.27] −0.075 [0.04, 0.52]
Controlled: accidental −0.167 [−0.19, 0.48] −0.198 [−0.06, 0.43] −0.266 [−0.51, 0.01]
Simple: complex −0.298 [−0.01, 0.55] −0.226 [−0.06, 0.48] −0.053 [−0.36, 0.26]
Strong: weak −0.234 [−0.53, 0.11] −0.177 [−0.43, 0.10] ------ ------
Unique: commonplace −0.444* [−0.64, −0.19] −0.288* [−0.49, −0.06] ------ ------
Serious: humorous −0.394* [−0.64, −0.07] ------ ------ ------ ------
Superficial: profound −0.409* [0.11, 0.64] ------ ------ ------ ------
Clear: hazy −0.632** [−0.73, −0.51] ------ ------ ------ ------
Full: empty −0.299 [−0.55, 0.00] ------ ------ ------ ------
Hard: soft −0.199 [−0.16, 0.51] ------ ------ ------ ------
ACTIVITY SCALESa
Lively: calm −0.448* [−0.66, −0.18] −0.132 [−0.39, 0.15] −0.298* [−0.53, −0.04]
Fast: slow −0.036 [−0.41, 0.35] −0.037 [−0.33, 0.26] ------ ------
Relaxed: tense −0.191 [−0.15, 0.49] −0.175 [−0.43, 0.11] ------ ------
Noisy: quiet −0.195 [−0.24, 0.56] ------ ------ ------ ------
Hot: cold −0.21 [−0.51, 0.13] ------ ------ ------ ------
Ratings made on 7-point bipolar scale (1 = “very good,” 2 = “quite good,” 3 = “slightly good,” 4 = “neither good nor bad”). *(Bold) Correlation significant at p < 0.05 (2-tailed)
non-parametric Kendall tau-b. **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; ‡p < 0.1.
aDivision of scales into Evaluative, Activity, and Potency based on Osgood et al. (1957).
bNegative correlation coincides with leftward term on scale, positive correlation coincides with rightward term.
cConfidence intervals calculations based on Asymptotic Standard Error.
self-awareness and epiphany. Those reporting FLC also rated
the art as significantly more “good.” Although not significant,
those reporting FLC also spent generally more time in the
gallery (Mdn = 20min) vs. no-FLC group (Mdn = 12,
p = 0.17).
Finally, Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test was
conducted on the self evaluations, looking individually at both
the FLC or no-FLC reporting groups. Among FLC viewers,
results did not reach significance. This group however did
show a notable trend of re-evaluating their selves as more cold
(Z = −1.73, p = 0.08, Hodges–Lehmann estimate for Mdn
score change = 0.5 [0, 1]) as well as less unique (Z = −1.73,
p = 0.08, Mdn change = 0.5 [0, 1]) following the experience.
Those who did not feel like crying did show significant re-
evaluations of themselves as more humorous (Z = −2.12,
p = 0.03; Mdn change = 0.5 [0, 2]). One significant correlation
was also found between FLC and pre-expectations, regarding
the statement “I usually understand art” (τB = 0.42 [0.17,0.62],
p = 0.02).
Discussion
Results appear to support most hypotheses made for feeling like
crying as an important phenomena within, and an indicator of,
“aesthetic” experience. There was a notable percentage of viewers
(43%) who responded affirmatively when asked about feeling
like crying as a component of their experience. This in itself
was somewhat surprising given the novelty of this question in
art/perception research.
Even more, results showed a pattern of correlations between
FLC and other factors that can be interpreted to represent the
full range of stages posited in the above model. FLC showed
significant correlations with: (1) tension, posited to occur in the
initial “cognitive mastery” stage involving arousal of discrepancy;
(2) need to escape, posited to accompany subsequent attempt
at secondary control; (3) self-awareness suggesting switch to
metacognitive or self-referential assessment; and ultimately (4)
relief, happiness, and epiphany, argued to suggest the final
“aesthetic” phase of the model. The above progression was
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 15 July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1006
Pelowski Tears and transformation
TABLE 4 | Comparison of key reported experiential factors between three hypothesized “feeling like crying/no- feeling like crying” + “confusion/
no-confusion” subgroups.
Rothko chapel, USA Kawamura, Japan Tate modern, England
Mediana H (η2)b Median H (η2) Median H (η2)
CONFUSION
No confusion + no cry 0.0 (n = 6) ------ 0.0 (n = 3)c ------ 0.0 (n = 9) ------
Confusion + no cry 2.5 (n = 6) 5.0 (n = 16) 3.0 (n = 9)
Confusion + cry 2.0 (n = 8) 4.0 (n = 9) 2.0 (n = 9)
ANXIETY
No confusion + no cry 0.0 5.44 (0.27) 0.0ab 6.20* (0.23) 0.0 4.78 (0.18)
Confusion + no cry 0.5 4.0a 0.0
Confusion + cry 1.5 2.0b 0.0
SELF-AWARENESS
No confusion + no cry 0.0a 10.45** (0.55) 0.0 3.03 (0.11) 3.0 8.86** (0.34)
Confusion + no cry 1.0b 1.0 0.0a
Confusion + cry 6.0ab 4.0 6.0a
Trigger
“Painting watching me” “Aware of others/ being watched” “Aware of others/being watched”
No confusion + no cry 1.0ab 7.54* (0.40) 0.0a 9.03** (0.33) 0.0 6.48* (0.25)
Confusion + no cry 2.5a 2.0b 0.0
Confusion + cry 2.5b 5.0ab 0.0
EPIPHANY
No confusion + no cry 0.0a 9.86** (0.52) 0.0 5.66* (0.21) 0.0a 13.72*** (0.53)
Confusion + no cry 3.0 0.0a 3.0b
Confusion + cry 5.0a 4.4a 6.0ab
HAPPINESS
No confusion + no cry 0.0ab 10.68** (0.56) 5.0 2.5 (0.09) 2.0ab 7.06* (0.27)
Confusion + no cry 3.5a 2.0 6.0b
Confusion + cry 5.0b 4.0 5.0a
All judgments made on 9-point scale (0 = “no such feeling,” 8 = “the highest such feeling in my life”).
*(Bold) p < 0.05, nonparametric Kruskall-Wallis test for comparisons of mean ranks; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
aMedians with the same subscripts differ significantly at p < 0.05, post hoc Mann-Whitney comparison, uncorrected.
bEffect size calculated following (Green and Salkind, 2005).
cThis study dropped the first outcome (No confusion + no cry) from statistical analysis within the paper discussion due to small sample size. It is shown here only for comparison
purposes. Please refer to the text for statistical results from comparison between the two remaining subgroups.
further highlighted after dividing viewers into combinations
of reported confusion and FLC. Again keeping in mind the
minimal group sizes, FLC viewers did appear to show all of
the elements above at significantly higher levels. On the other
hand, without FLC, individuals may or may not have shown
discrepancy (denoted by confusion), but did not show self
awareness, happiness, relief or epiphany, and also largely did not
find meaning in the art. The progression was even more clearly
shown in simple comparison between FLC/no-FLC subgroups
(Figure 7).
In art evaluation, FLC also showed significant correlation
with a number of assessments—precise, clear, lively, serious,
sincere, profound. While I make no attempt to parse these
individual assessments (such an analysis should be done in
future studies employing factor analysis), these responses are
commonly connected to the Potency or Activity regions
(Osgood et al., 1957). Following Carroll (1959), these
measures can also be interpreted to suggest a greater sense
of seriousness/stimuli importance and therefore may suggest
potential for self-adjustment. Transversely, when considered
from the direction of those who reported low incidence of feeling
like crying, and therefore found the art more remote, vague,
hazy, and insincere, these responses can be interpreted to reflect
a lack of potency/seriousness and therefore absolution from
involvement. Results also showed connections between FLC and
finding the artworks more meaningful and good. These hedonic
scales were also hypothesized to reflect the division between
aesthetic or facile/abortive experience.
Finally, regarding the “self transformation” argued to
accompany interpretive change, although results did not show
significant changes among viewers reporting feeling like crying,
the noted trend of FLC viewers re-evaluating themselves as more
“cold” and less “unique” does provide intriguing suggestion.
These terms typically have ties to relative impotency and
inactivity (Osgood et al., 1957), and therefore would coincide
with the hypothesis that schema change should be reflected in
devaluation of these qualities. At the same time, the significant
change discovered among those with no FLC is also intriguing.
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TABLE 5 | Comparison of reported experiential factors and artwork evaluations between viewers who do or do not “feel like crying” in three encounters
with museum art.
Rothko chapel, USA Kawamura, Japan Tate modern, England
Median CIc U(r) Median CI U(r) Median CI U(r)
NEED TO LEAVEa
No cry 0.0
(n = 12)
[0, 2] 18.0** (0.70) 0.0
(n = 19)
[0, 4] 105.0 (0.01) 0.0 (n = 18) [0, 0] 63.0* (0.46)
Cry 1.0
(n = 9)
1.0
(n = 11)
0.0 (n = 10)
SELF-AWARENESSa
No cry 0.0 [2, 6] 9.5*** (0.71) 0.0 [0, 3] 54.0* (0.41) 2.0 [1, 4] 39.0** (0.47)
Cry 6.0 4.0 5.5
AWARE OF OTHERS/BEING WATCHEDa
No cry 2.0 [0, 2] 48.0 (0.10) 2.0 [0, 5] 55.0* (0.40) 0.0 [0, 0] 63.0* (0.46)
Cry 2.0 4.0 0.0
EPIPHANYa
No cry 0.5 [3, 5] 21.5** (0.51) 0.0 [0, 4] 52.5* (0.43) 3.0 [1, 5] 25.0*** (0.60)
Cry 5.0 4.0 6.0
ARTWORK WAS MEANINGFULb
No cry 0.5 [0, 2] 58.0‡ (0.39) 0.0 [0, 2] 150.0* (0.37) 0.0 [1, 3] 160.0** (0.65)
Cry 2.0 2.0 2.0
ARTWORK WAS GOODb
No cry 0.0 [0, 3] 62.0* (0.44) 0.0 [0, 2] 161.5** (0.47) 1.0 [0, 2] 146.0** (0.53)
Cry 2.0 1.0 3.0
ARTWORK WAS BEAUTIFULb
No cry 0.0 [0, 3] 59.0‡ (0.39) 0.0 [0, 2] 171.0** (0.54) 1.0 [0, 2] 144.5** (0.52)
Cry 2.5 1.0 3.0
*(Bold) p < 0.05, Mann-Whitney two-sample rank-sum test; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; ‡p < 0.1.
aReported emotion/experiential factors based on 9-point scale (0 = “no such feeling,” 8 = “the highest such feeling in my life”).
bArtwork evaluations based on 7-point bipolar scale (e.g., 3 = “very good,” 2 = “quite good,” 1 = “slightly good,” 0 = “neither good/bad”).
cConfidence Interval based on Hodges-Lehman estimate of median difference between populations.
These individuals became more “humorous.” This term had
been argued (Goffman, 1974) to represent a general attempt
at re-classification of an encounter by reframing one’s self in a
manner that diminishes the seriousness or importance of one’s
involvement, and therefore reducing potential for impact on
the self, as well as previously showing inverse correlation with
crying (Labott andMartin, 1988). The correlation between feeling
like crying and pre-expectation of considering oneself able to
understand artworks also fits the argument that advancing past
the stages of assimilation and escape into an intractable situation
demanding schema change requires that a perceptual task have
vested interest, leading a prospective viewer to a situation not
easily dismissed.
Studies 2 and 3
At the same time, in addition to its compelling evidence for
feeling like crying as an empirical measure, Study 1 also raises
important questions and caveats. Chief among these is the
question of how common is feeling like crying experience? While
the above Study was able to show compelling evidence for
crying and for its demarcative position, as noted above, Study
1 was conducted with works specifically chosen for prior crying
notoriety. This raises the potential that the findings represent a
special case, or that feeling like crying itself may not so easily be
found in other instances. There was also an outstanding question
regarding the exact nature of meaning assessment within the
viewing of the art. It was argued that the sense of meaningfulness
should occur with the final aesthetic stage, as was found in our
analysis. This was however also argued to coincide with a switch
in the mode of assessment itself—from direct mimetic/syntactic
understanding, to lack of understanding in secondary control,
to a new interpretation based on experience within the final
aesthetic stage. While the other correlations (self-awareness, art
appraisal) support this argument, nature of meaning assessment
was beyond the study. Therefore, to further explore the above
questions, two subsequent studies were conducted with different
museums/art.
Both Studies 2 and 3 also utilized Rothko paintings, because
of its above-considered non-mimetic design. However both used
quite different works in terms of design and contexts, and in
settings with no expectation for crying as a response. Study 2
was conducted in another room devoted solely to a series of
Rothko paintings, containing seven (∼1.5–3m) works composed
of orange and red rectangles on darker ground, located at the
Kawamura Memorial DIC Museum in Japan (Figure 5). This
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FIGURE 7 | Comparison of key emotions and artwork evaluations between viewers who did or did not “feel like crying” in three encounters with
museum art.
study gave the opportunity, by using the same type of abstract art
within a different culture and language, to look for cross-cultural
similarity in responses as they might pertain to the underlying
cognitive progression. It also afforded a different color pallet,
while possible contamination from viewer prior knowledge of
the art/artist, although not found to be a factor above, was also
further reduced. Where an argument might be made for the
unique impact of the architecture/setting in the above study,
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the Kawamura room at the time of this study3 was also a truly
“neutral” gallery—composed of a rectangular space with off-
white walls, a central bench, no contextual information, and
the paintings arranged on all four walls—situated within the
larger museum. Therefore, while affording another controllable
study setting, it was expected that this room and its art would
be approached as just one from among many containing 20th
century painting.
Study 3 was conducted during a special exhibition at London’s
TateModern. This exhibition—“Mark Rothko the Late Paintings”
(Borchardt-Hume, 2008)—marked a large retrospective,
including a main gallery of 14 paintings from the same series as
Kawamura, with five paintings borrowed from the museum. It
also included several other series and color combinations spread
over nine rooms. While the rooms containing the art again
had no labels, the exhibition also included two rooms devoted
to educational information regarding the artist and technical
aspects of his painting. This location therefore offered the chance
to explore the above theory in a more general museum-wide
setting, and was included primarily to test whether FLC might
even be recorded in such a context.
Participants
The Kawamura study included 30 participants (M age = 42;
21 female), all native Japanese. The Tate study involved 28
participants (M age = 53.3; 16 female) all Western European,
and comfortable in English. Participants in both studies were
recruited on site from the population of—unlike Study 1—paying
patrons, with no offer of compensation.
Materials and Procedure
Procedure for Kawamura followed Study 1. Viewers were
approached upon entering the museum. After completing a pre-
test, they were instructed to engage with the targeted art. Unlike
Study 1, the target room was located within a larger museum.
Therefore, viewers were asked to proceed directly to this gallery.
When finished they were asked to exit through another doorway
at the back of this room leading directly to the lobby where they
were given the post-test. Therefore, the target art was presumably
the first and only art seriously encountered. In the Tate study,
the pre-test was omitted. Viewers instead entered the gallery—
again spatially separated from the other museum areas—without
prior knowledge that they would be questioned. This afforded
the opportunity to compare results from an experience without
any potential priming that might be engendered by a participant’s
known study participation. Upon exiting through a different door
viewers were met by a researcher who administered the post-test.
Questionnaires followed Study 1. However both subsequent
studies made use of a paired-down version omitting several
semantic scales and emotional factors which had not shown
significance or which had been judged to be redundant. A new
section on the post-test asking viewers to write a short answer to
the question “what did the art mean?” was also added in order
to ascertain mode of meaning assessment. In the Kawamura
study, questions were translated into Japanese by the author
3This arrangement, although keeping the same artworks, was moved to a larger
gallery in 2007.
and checked by two native speakers. Adjective pairs followed
translation by Tanaka et al. (1963).
Results and Discussion: Studies 2 and 3
Studies 2 and 3 showed general correspondence to Study 1, with
36% noting feeling like crying in both Kawamura (M = 3.6,
SD = 1.9) and Tate (M = 3.5, SD = 2.1). Correlation
analyses (reported for both studies in Table 2) also showed the
same basic patterns as in the previous study. In Kawamura
there was significant tie between FLC and self-awareness as
well as feeling of being watched, a potential trigger, epiphany,
and understanding the artist intention. In the Tate study, FLC
showed positive correlation with self-awareness, epiphany and
understanding intention.
The same hypothesized patterns were further supported when
comparing between viewers reporting different combinations
of confusion and FLC. As shown in Table 4, in Kawamura,
unlike the first study where viewers were essentially either
confused or not, results showed a high incidence of reported
confusion across all viewers and split between those individuals
reporting confusion without eventual FLC (n = 16) and
those reporting both (n = 9). On the other hand, there was
low incidence of individuals reporting neither factor (n =
3) and again few (n = 2) reporting confusion-free crying.
Once again, in comparison between the two groups where
confusion was reported, the magnitude was similar, suggesting
the same arousal of discrepancy within the earlier stages of their
respective experiences. In turn, when comparing between the two
confusion outcomes, it was again those who did feel like crying
who reported terms suggesting movement to insight/aesthetic
experience. The “FLC” group had significantly higher awareness
of being watched (U = 23.0, p = 0.004). The “FLC” group also
showed significantly higher epiphany (U = 34.5, p = 0.02).
There was also a non-significant trend of higher self-awareness
among the “FLC” (Mdn = 4.0) vs. “confusion, no-FLC” group
(Mdn = 1.0; U = 43.5, p = 0.09). (Note, “no-confusion,
no-FLC” group was dropped from analysis due to small sample.
However, it followed the same trend as the other studies. Results
including this group are provided in Table 4).
In the Tate study, much like Study 1, division of viewers
showed almost equal separation into the three posited outcomes,
with 32% (n = 9) reporting neither confusion nor FLC, 32%
(n = 9) reporting confusion without FLC and 32% (n = 9)
reporting confusion and FLC, and again only one individual
reporting confusion free crying. Comparison between the three
main groups (Table 4) again showed equally high levels of
confusion in both the “confusion, no-FLC” and “confusion,
FLC” outcomes. In turn, there was also significant differences
in reported self-awareness. as well as in the potential triggering
feeling of awareness of others/being watched, and in reported
happiness and epiphany, with post-hoc analysis of these latter two
factors showing the FLC outcome significantly higher than both
the facile and abortive conclusions.
Once again, the above patterns were even clearer in simple
comparison between FLC and no-FLC subgroups. As shown
in Table 5 (also Figure 7) both Tate and Study 1 showed
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significantly higher need to leave. Studies 2 and 3 showed
significantly higher awareness of others/being watched; and
all three studies showing significantly higher epiphany. In
Kawamura, mirroring Study 1, those reporting FLC also spent
roughly twice as long in the gallery (Mdn = 7.5 vs. 3.0min), in
this case reaching significance (U = 31.0, p = 0.03, r = 0.4,Mdn
difference estimate= 4min. [0–8]).
Correspondence to Study 1 also carried into artwork
evaluation (Table 3). The Kawamura study showed significant
correlations between FLC and finding the art more intimate
and unique. The Tate study showed correlation with more deep,
lively and sincere. Each of which typically relates to potency and
activity. Reading from the opposite direction, this also meant
that low FLC was concomitant with assessment of the art as
more remote, common, insincere and shallow, which may be
interpreted as indicating self-protection. FLC also correlated to
higher ratings with the typically hedonic scales of good and
beautiful in both studies, as well as—mirroring Study 1—finding
the art moremeaningful.
Regarding the specific assessment of meaning, written answers
to the question “what did the art mean?” were divided
into the three categories posited above: “semiotic/formal”
(answers which noted the historical or mimetic qualities); “no
understanding/meaninglessness;” and “experiential” (answers
which equated meaning to viewing experience). In Kawamura
(Table 6), Fisher’s Exact test revealed significant difference
(p = 0.03). Supporting the above hypothesis, 100% of viewers
who reported FLC explained meaning as tied to personal
experience—for example “looking into my inner self.” On the
other hand, among the no-FLC group, 43% explained the art
in experiential terms, 14% used semiotic/formal terms, and
43% said it was meaningless. In Tate, though not reaching
significance (p = 0.09), 71% of those who felt like crying showed
experiential appraisals, zero used formal/semantic assessment
and the remainder reported that the art was meaningless. Among
those who did not feel like crying, equal amounts (36%) reported
formal/mimetic meaning or meaninglessness, and 28.5% used an
experiential assessment.
Finally, in Kawamura where both pre- and post-tests were
administered, self re-evaluation among those feeling like crying
was again not significant. As in Study 1, there was a trend
among FLC-viewers of evaluation as more simple (Z = −1.86,
p = 0.06, Mdn change = 0.5 [0, 1]) and insincere (Z = −1.67,
p = 0.09, Mdn change = 0.5 [0, 1]) following the art viewing.
These measures are again typically tied to potency. On the
other hand, once again those who reported no FLC showed
significant self re-evaluations as more humorous (Mdn change =
0.0 [0,0.5], Z = −1.89, p = 0.05). This suggests that the specific
TABLE 6 | Answers to “what was the meaning of the art?” organized by reported feeling like crying and type of meaning appraisal: Rothko Room,
Kawamura DIC Museum, Japan.
Experiential meaning Semiotic/formal meaning No meaning/could not understand
Felt like crying n = 8 (100%) n = 0 (0%) n = 0 (0%)
• A feeling of being sandwiched and embraced
between many paintings
• Make the fine arts familiar
• Room for easing
• The slow experience of a movement of feeling
• Intuition…(after that) looking into my inner self
from the effect of time
• Assimilation of the space and your
consciousness, and a deepening
• At that time, your thoughts change
• Depends on the person
Did not feel like crying n = 6 (43%) n = 2 (14%) n = 6 (43%)
• A feeling of searching for (the essence) of art
• Soak in the art and look into your own soul
• I understand the (historical) meaning, but I
don’t like it.a
• I don’t know
• Face yourself…space…it’s difficult •Whatever the artist wanted the meaning to be • I don’t think they have a particular
meaning
• For me, it depends on the time of day and
your own status. Every time I enter the painting
to which I attend changes
• The meaning was so deep I
couldn’t understand
• The room reduces you back to a neutral state • I don’t know
• To make you think • ?b
• ?b
Answers translated from original Japanese by the author. Fisher’s Exact Test for differences in distribution (two-tailed), p = 0.03.
aSubject referred to the historical meaning in an earlier survey question and was referencing that in their answer here.
bSubjects wrote a literal question mark as their answer.
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humorous measure may play an intriguing role in especially
abortive or non-fulfilling outcomes, marking another intriguing
area for future research. In pre-expectations, Kawamura study
results were non-significant. Again, no significant connections
were found regarding demographics or knowledge of art or
artist.
Conclusion
This paper connected cognitive discussions of crying to the
case of tears in art, considering arguments for a mechanism
involving discrepancy, self-appraisal and schema change which
may underlie crying and more importantly may have a
fundamental similarity with insight or “aesthetic” experience as
they are argued to occur within recent psychological discussion.
Given this parallel, it was argued that tears—or even “feeling
like” crying—may suggest important outcomes in emotion,
cognition and evaluation, and may serve as a potential means
of demarcating perceptual (or art) experience. Feeling like
crying was hypothesized to coincide with a specific emotional
progression, as well as with an “experiential” interpretation of
art meaning rather than semiotic or formal; with beauty and
worth rather than ugliness; with potency of art rather than
devaluation, and ultimately with relative schema-change or “self-
transformation.”
Three exploratory studies, in three different settings,
supported most of these hypotheses, with 43% of viewers in
the Houston study, 36% in the Kawamura Museum in Japan
and 36% in London’s Tate Modern reporting incidence of
“feeling like crying” within their art experiences. Significant
correlations were found between feeling like crying and
emotional factors argued to correspond to full progression
of this model, and with specific connection between crying
and confusion, self-awareness and epiphany, argued to be the
key elements demarcating the movement through the three
main outcomes posited for perception, and with the latter
two occurring only in cases of insight/“aesthetic” experience.
Significant correlations were also between feeling like crying and
appraisal of art as potent, active, meaningful, and hedonically
beautiful/good. In Kawamura and Tate, where this question was
considered, we also found significant distribution of “experience-
based” assessment of meaning rather than direct informational
or no understanding among those reporting feeling like
crying.
Transversely, for those who did not feel like crying, experience
omitted final pleasurable, self-reflective and insightful emotion.
Non-criers also showed significant correlation to evaluations
of ugliness, meaninglessness, badness of art, and surface or
meaningless evaluations of the art’s significance, as well as
devaluation of the self as more humorous—suggesting the
potential importance of feeling like crying when considered
within an empirical context. Perhaps equally intriguing, our basic
ability to record meaningful answers to the question “did you feel
like crying”—occurring in two settings with no prior reason to
expect such reaction and, in the case of Study 3, in a setting in
which individuals had wandered a gallery of multiple artworks—
coupled with the consistency of findings when individuals did
answer affirmatively or negatively to this question, and with
cross-culture consistency, suggests “feeling like crying” might be
a common element in art experience.
This study also of course comes with caveats and demands
for future research. The studies are largely correlational. While
the connections between responses and feeling like crying,
as well as the differences when viewers either do or do not
report this outcome, support the hypothesized progression, this
must be substantiated in further studies, especially also with
larger samples and a broader range of art. This would also
allow for more advanced statistical modeling (e.g., multilevel
models), which would permit better causative assessment and
consideration of interactions between individual elements. In
addition, the artwork and self evaluations would benefit from
factor analyses in order to better test the implications of the data.
In fact, as noted above, I suggest that this paper be considered
as a first basis for such future research, and encourage the reader
to consider the findings more for their qualitative suggestion of
factor relationships that could be tested in further work. Future
study should also test for posited change in the self image, which
here did not reach significance, and might also further develop
the topic through a combination of quantitative and qualitative
approaches. Finally, it must be stressed that this paper does not
attempt to “prove” the cognitive theory of crying, which is beyond
the scope of the present study. In the attempt to study artworks
in their “natural” environment I also did not verify tears in
the gallery. Although supported by previous research, I make
no attempt to assert whether “feeling like crying” corresponds
to physical tears, or whether this too might show intriguing
difference.
That said, this paper raises the tentative, and compelling,
conclusion that answering in the affirmative to “did you feel like
crying” may indeed be a salient indicator of outcome in art or
other perceptual experience.
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